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The need for more efficiency in military organizations is growing. It is expected that a significant 
increase in efficiency can be obtained by an integration of communication and information tech- 
nology. This integration may result in (sub)systems that are fully automated, i.e., systems that are 
unmanned, including unmanned vehicles. In this paper, we focus on the automation of air defence 
systems, in which integration of communication and information technology is a major issue. We 
propose an architechue, in which each weapon system has the capability to control itself, whilst 
acting in a co-ordinated manner with other systems. To realise this task, a weapon system is ex- 
actly informed about the activities of all other weapon systems. In our architecture, the role of the 
men is reduced to the supervision of weapon systems. 
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1 Introduction 
While communication technology is an integral part of military systems, the potentials of infor- 
mation technology have recently been recognized by military organizations. Since it has been 
demonstrated that information technology provides the possibility to facilitate or to automate a 
wide variety of tasks that are currently performed by military experts, military organizations are 
rapidly adopting this technology. Exploiting information technology may lead to a decrease in the 
number of military personnel required for such tasks, and to an increase of the efficiency in mil- 
itary organizations. In Bef 5, 61, the need for more efficiency in military organizations has been 
discussed. It is expected that a further increase in efficiency can be obtained by the integration of 
communication and information technology. This integration may result in (sub)systems that are 
fully automated, i.e., systems that are unmanned, including unmanned vehicles. 
We are interested in the application of information and communication technology and in the 
impact of these technologies on air defence systems. An air defence system has as goal the defence 
of a predefined space against physical attack and espionage from the air. To realise this task, air 
defence systems are equipped with a wide variety of means, such as men, weapons, vehicles, 
sensors, etc. On the basis of the size of the space that should be defended, NATO distinguishes 
four categories of air defence systems namely, very short range air defence systems (vshorad), 
short range air defence systems (shorad), medium range air defence systems, and air defence 
fighters. Very short range air defence systems defend spaces that range up to 6 kilometres in a 
horizontal direction and up to 3 kilometres in a vertical direction. For short range air defence 
systems these sizes are 12 and 6 kilometres in horizontal and vertical direction respectively. For 
longer distances the remaining categories are used. 
In this paper, we focus on the automation of vshorad and shorad systems. Apart from military 
experts, these systems basically consist of a set of sensors and a set of kill vehicles, which may 
be located on geographically different bases. Sensors are used to detect incoming targets and to 
track these targets. Kill vehicles ate assigned to destroy targets. A combination of sensors and 
kill vehicles is called a weapon system, and a shorad/vshorad system can be regarded as a set of 
weapon systems that are controlled by military experts. Each weapon system is dedicated to the 
defence of a part of the space assigned to a vsborad/shorad system. 
We propose an atchitecture, referred to as distributed architecture, in which each weapon system 
has the capability to control itself in a co-ordinated manner. This architecture is based on two 
principles. First, each weapon system has access to the same set of data and the same capabilities 
to process this data. Second, each weapon' and sensor knows the strategies that are used to deploy 
sensors to observe an area, i.e., a part of the airspace, and to allocate weapons to targets. For 
example, strategies for sensor deployment and weapon allocation may be that an area is observed 
by the closest located sensor and a target is attacked by the closest located weapons, respectively. 
These principles have as consequence that each sensor or weapon may h o w  exactly what all 
other sensors and weapons are doing in the system, and can act in a co-ordinated manner. In our 
architecture, the role of the men is reduced to the supervision and maintenance of the system. 
The distributed architecture is only viable if the technology to handle the two principles is suffi- 
ciently mature, and we believe that this is the case. To handle the first aspect of the first principle, 
that is, to provide each weapon system the access to the same set of data, we propose a network 
to which all entities, including other sensors and weapons, are connected. Each sensorlweapon 
or other connected entity is able to extract data from the net, and is able to request net capacity 
(bandwidthltime slots) in order to put data on the net. The acceptance of the request and the ca- 
pacity that will be allocated to an entity depends on the load of the network and on the importance 
of the data for other entities. So, dynamic allocation of net capacity is the proposed solution. 
To handle the second aspect of the first principle, that is, to provide processing capabilities to 
each weapon system, the architecture should be equipped with algorithms to perform the tasks 
that are required for (very) short range air defence, such as data fusion, threat evaluation, weapon 
allocation, etc. In the literature, a wide variety of potential algorithms has been reported to perform 
these tasks, see [Ref 2, 3, 6, 91. We propose a framework in which many of these algorithms 
can be captured. In this framework, we distinguish a pool of algorithmic skeletons and a pool of 
logical operators. An algorithmic skeleton consists of important control statements. By combining 
operators and algorithmic skeletons, an algorithm can be generated for a specific task. 
It is clear that the second principle, i.e., each weapon system hows the strategies for sensor 
deployment and weapon allocation, can be handled with above-mentioned techniques as well. 
The main advantages of our architecture are performance and reliability. Performance is achieved 
by the fact that a weapon system has its own processing capabilities and the possibility to load 
and organize data in an efficient way. Note, that a bad organization of data may lead to a poor 
performance of an overall system [Ref 11. Reliability is achieved by the fact that each weapon 
system is informed about each other's activities, which avoids situations that a target is over- 
killed, or, even worse, that a target is not attacked at all. Other nice properties of the architecture 
'In the following, the terms weapon and kill vehicle are used interchangeably 
are that it supports modularity and graceful degradation. We note that these latter two properties 
are also inherent to an autonomous architecture. The main difference between our architecture and 
systems based on an autonomous architecture, such as the US FAAD system, is that in the latter 
architecture weapon systems are not informed about each other's activities. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, we discuss the distributed 
architecture in more detail. Since communication and processing algorithms play a major role in 
this architecture, the two consecutive chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to them. Finally, the paper is 
concluded in Chapter 5. 
2 Distributed Architecture 
Our framework to automate air defence systems is based on the concept that each weapon system 
has the capability to control itself in a coordinated manner. Therefore, we propose an architecture 
in which all entities are connected to a network. As soon as an entity obtains new informatioddata, 
it puts it on the network. All other entities have the possibility to access this informatioddata. In 
order to realize that entities act in a coordinated manner, all entities have the same processing 
algorithms. So, processing of the same data will result in the same results at each entity, given 
instantaneous differences due to time delays. 
The entities that are distinguished for the time-being are weapon systems and command centres. 
The basic architecture is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Basic architecture 
A weapon system consists of a set of kill vehicles and a set of sensors. Communication between 
kill vehicles andlor sensors is realised through the network. Typical information that will be put 
on the net by kill vehicles are plans to attack a target. Sensors will put measurements performed 
in the real world on the network. 
A command centre is hierarchically organised, consisting of three levels. A battalion at the highest 
level controls a set of batteries, and a battery in its turn controls a set of platoons. Each level is 
connected to the network. So, information from the battalion destinated for a battery can also be 
obtained by a platoon. Although each entity in a specific level has all available information and 
processing capabilities to take justified decisions, the reason to preserve the hierarchical organi- 
zation in command centres is that a higher level echelon should have the possibility to overrule a 
decision at a lower level echelon. 
The different levels in a command centre are distinguished by the functions that are performed at 
each level. While the tasks to be performed at higher levels are strategical in character, at lower 
levels the tasks are more tactical. For example, a battalion is also connected with external systems 
and it may receive recognised air picture data from these systems. It is the responsibility of the 
battalion to select and distribute proper data to all entities through the network. At platoon level, 
weapons are commanded to attack a target. 
The major advantages of distributing data to all entities through a network are reliability and 
performance. Reliability is achieved by the fact that each entity is informed about the activities of 
all other entities and that each entity is capable to obtain and process data. By informing entities 
about their activities, situations of over-kill or not engaging a target can be avoided. For example, 
suppose that wl is the most obvious weapon to engage a target, but is unable to fulfil this task for 
some reason. Since the second obvious weapon, let's say w2, can observe that wl is not going to 
engage the target, w2 knows that it should engage the target. 
By providing each entity processing capability, entities become independent of each other. So, 
they do not suffer from entities that fail to perform processing tasks. Let us consider the following 
situation for track correlation. Suppose that only one entity is able to perform track correlation 
and is also responsible for putting updated tracks on the network. If this entity fails to perfonn this 
task, then the entities have an obsolete track. Furthermore, the measurements provided by sensors 
in this case can be considered as a waste of effort. Another advantage of providing processing 
capability to each entity is that even if an entity fails to process some data, it still can obtain the 
results of processing, since other entities have processed the data, and may put it on the net. 
Performance is achieved by the fact that there is a minimum delay in obtaining data, since all data 
is freely available. Since each entity has its own processing facilities, the queues for processing 
an amount of data will be much shorter compared to the situation, in which there would be one 
processing unit and each entity was assigned to this unit. Furthermore, processing algorithms may 
be hlned towards the tasks that should be performed by an entity, e.g., by incorporating specific 
domain knowledge in the algorithms. An additional advantage of providing each entity processing 
facilities is that graceful degradation is supported. This means that if some entities are completely 
destroyed, the other entities can still perform their tasks. 
Since an enormous amount of data may flow through the network, congestion of the network is an 
obvious possibility in this architecture. In the next chapter, we describe a method to prevent and 
to cope with congestion. 
3 Communication 
In the proposed architecture (Figure I), relevant data need to be shared between entities in an "all 
know everything" setup. Therefore data generated by one entity (e.g. relating to the detection of 
air targets by a sensor) should be available nearly instantaneously throughout the system, e.g., for 
track correlation, multi-sensor data fusion, threat evaluation, etc. This obviously calls for high- 
capacity data transmission between the system's elements. However, in multi-element wireless 
communication, capacity usually is limited. 
A military network's data throughput capacity is embodied in time slots and frequencieslbandwidths 
embedded in a cyclic framework. A well-known representation (derived from the system Link-16 
protocols) is shown in Figure 2. At the setup of such a (secure) communications network, each 
element is allotted an appropriate number of slots within the cycle in which it may transmit, at the 
prescribed hopping frequencies. In practice, this method leads to non-optimal usage of network 
capacity, as slots are allotted to system elements regardless of the volume of data generated and 
also regardless of the relevance of such data to the task. E.g., sensors having nothing of interest to 
report still consume part of the communications capacity. 
In a typical air assault scenario, some entities (e.g. the upfront sensors) may generate lots of 
relevant data as they "see" many new targets. Such information may consist of track data as well 
as of signature characteristics. If the number of transmission slots originally allotted to those 
sensors is insufficient for transmission of all of the relevant information, optimal application of 
network capacity requires allocation of extra resources for the timely dispersion of such data. 
A method of optimizing transmission capacity in a distributed network is proposed here. It is 
called the dynamic allocation of slots, frequencies and bandwidths. In this method, each system 
element requiring to transmit extra data fist submits a transmission request comprising a weighted 
assessment of the urgency of its data. Since in the proposed architecture knowledge is dispersed 
throughout the system and entities possess the intelligence to decide whether the information they 
generate merits putting it on the net, the assessment of urgency can be made. m i c a l  parameters 
that play a role in such an assessment are new target recognition results, optimum kill probability, 
time left to last launch opportunity, value of the threatened asset, etcetera. The extra slots (fre- 
quencies, bandwidths) are allocated dynamically, through a distributed management function and 
in proportion to the "weights" of the current requests. This approach is thought to be feasible, 
since successful time sharing schemes for mainframe computer operating systems are based on a 
similar concept. We further believe the method is promising, as it may generate a more efficient 
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Fig. 2 Cyclic representation of frequency bands vs. time slots 
application of a scarce commodity. 
We note that theproposed method should be complementary applied to (existing) data compress- 
ing techniques. It has been proven that data compressing techniques may considerably reduce a 
piece of data that should be transmitted. Once the transmitted data has been received, it may be 
decompressed such that the semantic of the original data is preserved. 
, 
4 Processing algorithms 
In Figure 1, it is depicted that processing algorithms are required by weapon systems as well as by 
command centres. Within a command centre algorithms are required at all levels for various tasks. 
Q~ical tasks that may be performed by algorithms are track filtering and correlation (in order to 
produce air pictures), identification, threat evaluation, weapon allocation, etc. While some of these 
tasks should be performed by most entities and at each level, other tasks are performed just at some 
levels within a command centre. For example, an air picture is built up by all entities and on each 
level. Therefore, all entities and all levels should be equipped with track filtering, correlation, and 
data fusion algorithms. Intelligence gathering is a task that will typically be performed at battery 
and/or battalion level. So algorithms that support this task should be installed at these levels. 
Many algorithms reported in the literature can be used to perform a wide range of tasks required 
for air defence systems. As an example, let us consider the task of track filtering and potentially 
useful algorithms for this task that can be found in text books. The core of track filtering is deciding 
whether a point is within or outside a polygon. Track filtering provides the possibility to remove 
air tracks that are outside a geographical area of interest. 
Possible solutions for track filtering might be based on, e.g., point inclusive algorithms or nearest 
neighbour algorithms. Theidea behind point inclusive algorithms is to draw a vertical or horizontal 
line from a point to the polygon, while counting the number of intersections between the line and 
the polygon. An even number of intersections implies that the point is outside the polygon, while 
an odd number implies that the point is inside the polygon. Intersections that are also a point of 
contact are counted as two intersections. Theidea behind nearest neighbour algorithms is to assign 
a point to the most likely polygon. Therefore, these algorithms compute for all (relevant) polygons 
the probability that a point is within a polygon. 
What algorithm to select for a task depends on the characteristics of the task and the available 
input. In general, each algorithm will have its own strong and weak points. For example, a point 
inclusive algorithm may be very fast, but on the other hand, it requires a detailed geometrical 
description of the polygon. 
In the next chapter, we propose a framework that captures a wide variety of algorithms that may 
be used for several tasks by air defence systems. 
4.1 Framework 
Our main goal is to develop and implement algorithms that may be used for several air defence 
tasks. It has been widely recognised that the development of software for complex systems is 
a tough process. Therefore, several methodologies have been developed to facilitate this task at 
various levels, ranging from the design to the implementation. For example, data-driven, object- 
oriented, and top-down functional methodologies are well known at the design level, and for pro- 
gramming purposes the top-down and bottom-up methodologies are well known. Depending on 
the nature of an application, software engineers choose a number of these methodologies to de- 
velop software. For the software development of the proposed air defence system architecture, we 
will not design software from scratch but attempt to tailor existing algorithms for various func- 
tions. In general, the pseudo-code of these algorithms can be found in textbooks. Tailoring an 
algorithm to a function boils down to, e.g., 
Verifying whether the assumptions on which an algorithm is based are realistic for the func- 
tion or not, e.g., is the input expected by the algorithm available? 
What is the best way to represent the input for the algorithm? The representation should be 
such that it fits the problem domain, i.e., the problem that should be solved by the function. 
Are all operators in the algorithm meaningful? If not, should they be modified, or deleted? 
Are the control statements in the algorithm meaningful or should they be modified, or 
deleted? 
How should the output be represented? 
We note that performing the above-mentioned tasks successfully requires advanced skills of a 
software engineer. 
On the one hand, we have observed that several (textbook) algorithms might be used for a specific 
air defence task, while on the other hand an algorithm might be used for several air defence 
tasks. For example, a point inclusive algorithm as well as a nearest neighbour algorithm can 
be used for track filtering, while the latter algorithm can also be used for identification and threat 
evaluation. Our goal is to come up with a set of algorithms such that a single algorithm might be 
used for several air defence systems tasks on the one hand and on the other hand, we prefer to 
have several algorithms available to perform a task. To realise this goal, we suggest to implement 
a set of algorithmic skeletons and a set of operators. In an algorithmic skeleton, important control 
statements are implemented and operators are implemented in an abstract way. In a separate 
pool, operators are implemented in more detail. An operator describes how objects should be 
represented and what its impact will be on each object. Once these two sets are available, a user 
may construct its own algorithms by combining skeletons and operators. In this way, we re-use 
software as much as possible. 
We note that for many textbook algorithms the distinction between algorithmic skeletons and 
operators can easily be made. Observe that an algorithm can be regarded as an ordered list of 
control statements and operations. 
Con~pile and Execute  
Once an algorithm has been constructed by Combining operators with an algorithmic skeleton, this 
algorithm has to be instantiated. This means that values for the input parameters should be made 
available to the algorithm. Then, the algorithm can be compiled and executed. In Figure 3, the 
whole process is depicted. 
Fig. 3 Framework to capture algorithms 
Operators 
The main advantage of our framework is that there are several alternative algorithms to perfom a 
task, each with its own strong and weak points. If the result of an algorithm is unsatisfactory, one 
may assemble another algorithm. 
Algoritmic Skeletons 
4.2 An example 
In this section, we illustrate our framework by means of a simplified identification algorithm. 
Identification algorithms collect datalevidences from multiple sources and combine these data 
in order to produce a composite identification of an object. Potential sources of data include 
recognised air pictures, procedural indicators (e.g., restricted area violations), acoustic sources, 
etc. 
Processing AlgoriUun 
In our example, the goal is to determine what objects are in the airspace on the basis of a se- 
quence of independent evidences. To solve this problem, we will discuss two techniques that 
might be used namely, one emanated from probability theory [Ref 71 and the other emanated from 
Dempster-Shafer theory [Ref 81. Both theories provide us a tool to combine several bodies of 
evidence. For the similarities and differences between these theories, we refer to [Ref 41. In the 
following, we will stress the combination of evidences. 
In the airspace, we want to distinguish between civil aircraft, military aircraft, and birds. The set 
D = {civil aircraj?, military aircraft, bird) is called the frame of discernment. As time went on, 
evidences will be collected that support or reject a subset of D. 
Let D' 2 D, and P(D1le,) be the probability in D' given a sequence of el ,  e2, ea, ..., en evi- 
dences. To update the probability in Dl, whenever a new body of evidence e becomes available, 
the following formulae can be used according to probability theory. 
and 
. . 
Note that in the formula above we assumed that evidences are independent of each other. 
Before introducing the rule to combine evidences according to the Dempster-Shafer theory, we 
introduce the notion of basic probability assignment. A basic probability assignment to a set 
D', m(D1)  can be regarded as the measure of belief that is exactly committed to Dr. A basic 
probability assignment should satisfy the following properties m(0) = 0 and C,,,, - m(D1)  = 1. 
Let me, (.) bethe basic probability assignment induced by a sequence of evidences e l ,  e2, es, ..., en. 
To update the belief in a set D', whenever a new body of evidence e becomes available the follow- 
ing formula can be used. 
in which D' is a non empty set, Di, D j  c D,  and 
K = me,(Di)me(Dj) 
D i n D j # O  
We note that K is a normalization constant and is required to meet the property m(0) = 0. 
Each of the above mentioned techniques can be implemented as a sepatate combination operator. 
Let our pool of operators consists of Combinefrob, which is based on probability theory and 
Combine-DS, which is based on Dempster-Shafer theory. 
Assume that the following algorithmic skeleton is available, in which a Combine operator appears. 
Program Skeleton(D, Var Concl); 
Get(e); I* Get reads a body of evidence I* 
first-evidence := 'true'; 
while e # " do 
j:= 0; 
while j < 2D do 
Combine(D1[j], firstevidence, e, Coizcl); 
I* Combine updates the belief/ 
likelihood in D'[j] I* 
j:= j i l ;  
od; 
Get(e); 
if first-evidence = 'true' 
then first-evidence := 'false'; 
od; 
end. 
This skeleton requires as input a frame of discernment D,  e.g., D = {civil aircraft, military air- 
craf, bird}. The output, referred to as Conclusion, will be subset(s) of D to which a measure 
is attached expressing the beliefllikelihood that an object can be identified which one of the el- 
ements in the subset(s). As long as evidences are available, the beliefilikeliiood in each subset 
D' c D is updated by the skeleton. Suppose that the a priori probabilities P(e) and the a posteri- 
ori probabilities P(elD1), in which D' E {civil aircraf, military aircraft, bird) and the goal is to 
identify whether an object is a bird, a civil or a military aircraft. Then, the above mentioned skele- 
ton together with the Combine-DS operator can be used for this purpose. Now the identification 
program will be 
Program Identification(D, Var Corzcl); 
Get(e); 
first-evidence := 'true'; 
while e # " do 
j:= 0; 
while j < zD do 
Combine_Prob(Dr lj], firstevidence, e, Concl); 
j:= j+l; 
od; 
Get(e); 
if first-evidence = 'hue' 
then first-evidence := 'false'; 
od; 
end. 
Once we have specified the input values, i.e., D,  the required probabilities, the program is instan- 
tiated and ready for execution. 
We note that if both probabilities P(e)  and P(elD1) are not available, we have the possibility to 
build in the CombineDS into the skeleton, resulting in an alternative identification program. 
Suppose that our pool of operators contains a combination operator that is able to combine images, 
i.e., a body of evidence results in an image of an environment and we are able to combine different 
images, the same skeleton may be used for threat evaluation. 
Summarising, we propose a framework that consists of a pool of operators and a pool of algo- 
rithmic skeletons. An operator manipulates a number of objects according to a certain technique. 
An algorithmic skeleton consists of control statements and abstractly defined operators. Now, an 
algorithm may be conshucted by combining skeletons with operators. In tbis way, operators and 
skeletons can be used for several air defence tasks, and several alternatives will be available for a 
single air defence task. 
5 Conclusions & further research 
We have discussed a framework for the the automation of air defence systems. In this framework, 
the integration of information and communication technology is a major issue. We have proposed 
a disbibuted architecture, in which each weapon system has the capability to control itself in a co- 
ordinated manner. In this architecture, a weapon system is exactly informed about the activities 
of all other weapon systems. We have touched on how our architecture can be implemented 
using information and communication technology. Communication between entities and adequate 
processing of data by each entity are of vital importance. Communication between entitities is 
realised through a communication net, and net capacity is dynamically allocated to entities. For 
the processing of data, we have proposed to implement a wide variety of algorithmic skeletons 
and operators. An algorithm to perform an air defence task may be constructed by combining 
algorithmic skeletons and operators. 
Furthermore, we have discussed the advantages of our architecture in relation with other architec- 
tures. 
Topics for further research are the implementation and evaluation of the architecture. 
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